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Abstract 
The use of part-time jobs is steadily increasing in most advanced economies. Previous literature 
has concluded that part-time workers suffer a wage penalty, but its magnitude varies across 
studies and countries. The part-time penalty is the otherwise unexplained element of the gap 
between full-time and part-time hourly earnings. One potential factor accounting for 
international differences in this penalty is the coverage of collective bargaining. This article 
outlines research examining wage differences between part-time and full-time male and female 
workers in Spain, a country with a very high level of coverage of collective agreements but very 
heterogeneous regional labour markets. Results are obtained using an econometric 
decomposition specifically adapted to matched employer-employee data. They show that intra-
firm wage differentials for part- and full-time workers with the same characteristics are 
negligible. But results that are perhaps less expected are those based on the regional analysis — 
an unprecedented perspective compared with the previous literature.  These results show that 
despite very significant differences in economies and labour markets, observed wage gaps 
between part-time and full-time workers in each Spanish region are also mainly explained by 
different endowments of individual, job and firm characteristics. Overall, our evidence 
highlights the over-riding role of wage setting mechanisms, specifically collective bargaining 
coverage, in minimising inter-regional differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers. 
JEL Codes: J31, J22, J41, R23 
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1. Introduction 
The number of part-time jobs has increased slightly but continuously in most advanced 
economies over the last decades. The ratio over total employment of part-time workers in the 
OECD increased from 13.9% in 1988 to 17.1% in 2013. Driving this type of employment are 
demand factors, such as the increasing importance of the service sector and fixed costs per 
employee, but also supply factors, like increasing women’s labour participation (Euwals and 
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Hogerbrugge, 2006; Montgomery, 1988). Furthermore, many governments have seen part-time 
jobs as a way of responding to economic crisis and have propelled their growth, given that they 
offer greater flexibility to firms in the use of their labour force while at the same time facilitating 
job creation. 
Part-time employment is usually considered as a component of the secondary labour 
market that grants flexibility to firms while providing opportunities for workers with low 
qualifications or less closely linked to employment. However, the international literature 
concludes that part-time workers suffer a wage penalty that differs across countries, probably 
owing to differences in the wage determination process and the characteristics of collective 
bargaining. In fact, in countries with lower coverage of the collective bargaining, the wage 
penalty is usually higher. The part-time wage penalty is defined as that proportion of the raw gap 
between the hourly wage of full-time and part-time employees that is not explained by other 
factors such as worker, job, firm or regional characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows a clear relationship between the wage penalty found by different studies 
(summarised below) and the coverage of collective bargaining in the considered countries. 
Taking this into account, the objective of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyse the existence (or 
not) of a wage penalty for part-time workers in the Spanish labour market; second, to check if 
there are differences in the penalty between Spanish regions. According to the previous 
exposition, our hypothesis is that, due to the high coverage of the collective bargaining, the wage 
penalty for part-time workers would be reduced and, moreover, if the size of this penalty is 
mainly driven by differences in labour market institutions related to collective wage bargaining, 
relevant regional differences would not be observed. 
We begin by comparing changes in the incidence of part-time employment in Spain and 
Europe, and by providing analysis of the Spanish regulatory framework and regional diversity, 
establishing the rationale for the investigation. A review of the relevant literature then provides 
the conceptual tools used to analyse the contribution to the size of the part-time wage penalty of 
collective bargaining coverage, relative to other factors. The fourth section presents the database 
and the econometric methodology. The fifth section outlines the findings, and the last section 
summarises the conclusions of the analysis. 
Context and rationale 
In Spain, although the incidence of part-time employment has traditionally been low (it 
increased from 4.2% in 1987 to 6.8% in 1995), it accelerated over more recent decades (10.8% 
in 2007 and 15.7% in 2015), propelled by a legal change approved in late 2013 allowing more 
flexibility in the number of working hours (IMF[International Monetary Fund], 2015). The 
recent economic crisis has represented a significant loss of jobs in Spain. Between 2008 and 
2014, more than three million jobs (15% of 2008 employment levels) were destroyed. However, 
during these years the number of part-time jobs increased by more than 350,000 people (a 14.7% 
increase over a six year period) (INE [Instituto Nacional de Estadística], 2016). 
From an international perspective, the share of part-time workers in Spain is still a 
moderate figure, lower than the averages for the OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] (17.1%), the EU [European Union] (19.6%) and the Eurozone (21.5%) 
averages. The traditionally low presence of part-time jobs in Spain is probably explained 
because its regulation has not been clear until very recently (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2008; 
Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010), but also because Spanish firms have usually 
tended to achieve flexibility mainly through fixed-term contracts. On the other hand, it must be 
noted that a prominent characteristic of part-time employment in Spain is that, in contrast to 
most developed countries, it is mainly involuntary. Thus, according to Eurostat (2016a) figures 
for 2014, a 64% of total part-time work in Spain was involuntary (70% for men and 62% for 
women), whereas the averages for the OECD, the European Union and the Eurozone were 21% 
 3  
(23% for males and 20% for females), 29% (40% for males and 26% for females), and 32% 
(42% for males and 29% for females) respectively. 
Even though largely involuntary, part-time employment in Spain is on the whole highly 
regulated. The Spanish labour market follows the so-called Mediterranean model (Sapir, 2005). 
Union density is relatively low (16%), but the coverage of collective agreements is very high, 
close to 80% (ILO — International Labour Office, 2015), as a result of the legal extension of 
collective agreements. Sectoral collective bargaining predominates, covering the 90% of 
employees covered by agreements, while firm level bargaining represents only 10%, although it 
has been clearly promoted by the 2012 labour reform. Regarding sectoral bargaining, although 
there are national sectoral collective agreements that apply throughout the Spanish territory, 
most sectoral agreements are negotiated at regional (NUTS [Nomenclature of Units for 
Territorial Statistics] 2 level) or, especially, provincial levels (NUTS 3). These agreements apply 
to all companies and workers in the sector and territory, so that the coverage of collective 
bargaining is in general very high in all Spanish regions. The minimum wage accounts for 36% 
of the average wage, Spain being one of the advanced countries with the lowest percentage 
together with the United States, Estonia and the Czech Republic. However, Spain is the 
European country with the lowest percentage (0.2%) of workers earning less than 105% of the 
minimum wage (Eurostat, 2016b). 
Wage differentials in Spain have traditionally been small, as in most continental Europe 
countries, due to the high coverage of collective agreements. However, during the crisis, wage 
inequality in Spain increased due to the wage devaluation suffered by those workers who have 
had to change jobs during the last years, mostly temporary workers (Font et al., 2015). After 
Poland, Spain is the second European country with the largest presence of temporality (26% of 
employees) (Eurostat, 2016a). This high figure is usually explained by the characteristics of the 
Spanish productive structure, with a high specialisation in activities such as services and 
construction, and the high costs of firing permanent workers (Jaumotte, 2011). 
The employment rate of Spanish women is 50%, ten points below men and nine points 
below the employment rate for European women. However, women now represent 45% of the 
total Spanish employment. Female workers are predominant in several service activities (retail, 
hospitality, health and other services) and in two manufacturing sectors (clothing and the 
pharmaceutical industry) (INE, 2016). We will thus analyse wage penalisation for part-time 
workers in the Spanish labour market, distinguishing among men and women. 
Spain’s recent increasing trend in part-time employment, which will probably continue in 
the future, together with the mainly involuntary nature of this type of employment, clearly 
justifies interest in analysing the main characteristics of part-time jobs in Spain, including 
wages. Although economic theory gives reasons to expect a wage penalisation for part-time 
employees, and previous studies for other countries show that this is a stylised fact in the labour 
markets of other advanced countries, research on the Spanish case is rather scarce and 
inconclusive, which justifies interest in advancing knowledge of the consequences of part-time 
employment for wages in this economy. Moreover, owing to the high coverage of collective 
bargaining in Spain (close to 80%), we expect that the size of the wage penalty associated with 
part-time work will be relatively low. 
Next, we carry out a regional analysis of the wage penalty for part-time workers — as far 
as we know, a novel approach in the international literature. The Spanish case is especially 
attractive from this perspective, given that regional differences in the incidence of part-time 
employment are rather important, and observed wage differences between part-time and full-
time workers also exhibit a significant regional heterogeneity. In Spain, regional labour markets 
and regional economies have traditionally exhibited very important differences, including 
unemployment rates (López-Bazo et al., 2005; Bande et al., 2008) and demographic trends. For 
instance, while some regions concentrate most of the population, in others it is dispersed (Ayuda 
et al., 2010; Goerlich and Mas (2008). The regional capacity to attract foreign workers has also 
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been unequal (González and Ortega, 2011), while internal migratory flows have remained 
subdued (Bentolila, 1997). As discussed by Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto (2016), clear 
specialisation patterns are present in Spanish regions. While some regions such as Madrid, the 
Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia are specialised in manufacturing and market services, 
the rest of regions are mainly specialised in construction, non-commercial services and energy 
and primary services activities. These industries have higher sensitivity to business cycles and 
suffered more during the last recession. R&D activities and innovative capacities are also 
geographically concentrated in a few regions (Coronado and Acosta, 1997). The high level of 
decentralisation (according to the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2010, the sub-
national share in total government expenditure is 48% and regional authorities are responsible 
for active labour market policies) is another distinguishing feature of the Spanish political 
system that has to be taken into account in this context. 
All in all, the nature of the wage differentials observed between full-time and part-time 
workers, together with the structural differences between Spanish regions and their labour 
markets and the high coverage of wage bargaining, make the analysis particularly interesting. 
While high bargaining coverage suggests that differences in regional wage penalties will be 
reduced, the high level of regional heterogeneity casts some doubts about this prediction. Taking 
into account that there are no previous studies looking at the regional dimension in this context, 
our analysis tries to provide novel evidence regarding which forces predominate in the process 
of wage determination. Our empirical analysis for the Spanish economy relies on the use of an 
employer-employee dataset, the Spanish Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Survey of Earnings 
Structure; hereafter SES). The use of such matched employer/employee data is rare in most 
previous studies in the topic (some exceptions can be found in Mumford and Smith, 2008 and 
O’Dorchai et al., 2007). Moreover, an econometric decomposition specifically adapted for use 
with this kind of data that allows controlling for the effect of unobserved firm heterogeneity on 
wages is employed. 
2. Literature review 
Part-time employment is usually seen as another component of the secondary labour market that 
grants flexibility while providing employment for persons with low qualifications or less closely 
linked to the labour market (students or young adults, women limited by familial responsibilities, 
advanced age adults or those approaching retirement, among others). The characteristics usually 
associated with part-time jobs include lower wages, high temporality and, in the case of certain 
countries or modalities of partial employment, fewer worker rights (such as paid holidays, 
remuneration for medical leave or firing costs). Part-time employees are presented as having: 
reduced access to social security benefits (Houseman and Matchiko, 1998); fewer labour 
progress opportunities (Tilly, 1990; Russo and Hassik, 2008); smaller pensions (Ginn and Arber, 
1998; O'Connell and Gash, 2003); less labour stability (Muñoz Bustillo et. al., 2008; Fernández-
Kranz et. al., 2014); and a lower unionisation rate (Belous, 1988). 
The issue that has garnered the most attention of researchers is the study of wage 
differences. The stylised facts of this international literature (summarised in Table A1) suggest 
that there is in general a negative wage difference (in terms of hourly wage) for part-time 
employees when compared to full-time employees1 and that part of this raw wage gap is 
explained by differences between each group in worker characteristics, whether observable or 
unobservable. Moreover, the characteristics of the job and the firm contribute to explaining the 
wage differential significantly, given that many part-time workers are engaged in low-wage 
occupations, industries, and firms (Hirsch, 2005, among others). However, despite adding 
multiple explanatory factors, an unexplained part of the wage differential usually persists, which 
is considered the wage penalty associated with working part-time. This wage penalty could be 
null for young people accessing their first job (Russo and Hassik, 2008), while there is abundant 
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evidence that the differential increases with age and especially with years worked in part-time 
positions (Wolf, 2014) and that wage increases over time are also lower for part-time workers 
(Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011). While abundant gender analyses agree that the 
wage penalty is usually greater for women than for men, studies making disaggregated 
estimations are scarce. Studies disaggregating by levels of qualification conclude that the wage 
penalty is greater for the most qualified workers, as they suffer more from the effects of 
occupational degradation (Connolly and Gregory, 2009). Empirical evidence differentiating by 
labour market segments finds that the wage penalty is almost entirely due to the concentration of 
part-time employment in the secondary labour market (O'Connell and Gash, 2003). On the other 
hand, studies with regional disaggregation have rarely been conducted. Only two previous 
studies examine a territorial level lower than the national level: Harris (1993) examines the issue 
for women in Northern Ireland, finding a penalty of 19%, and Wolf (2014) distinguishes 
between West and East Germany, obtaining similar results for both parts of the country. 
Studies for the Spanish economy are rather scarce and present very dissimilar results, so 
additional evidence is needed. A first generation of papers, working with the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) estimate positive wage premiums for both genders, 
whether controlling or not for self-selection with probits (Cebrián et al., 2000, Pissarides et al., 
2005; Pagán, 2007). More recently, using data from the Continuous Sample of Working 
Histories (MCVL in Spanish), Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) obtain (for 25 to 
45 year-old women only) a wage penalty of 11.4 points, controlling for occupations and adding 
firm fixed effects. In more recent work with the same database, Fernández-Kranz et al. (2014) 
estimate that part-time women aged 23 to 45 have wage penalties of -6.1 logarithmic points if 
they have indefinite contracts and of -9.0 points if the contract is temporary. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
This research is based on cross-section microdata from the most recent available wave of the 
SES, corresponding to 2010. The SES is a nationally representative survey on firms, covering 
employees at establishments of any size. It encompasses the bulk of the Spanish private sector, 
excluding only specific industries such as agriculture and domestic service. 
Because the survey design is based on a two-stage sampling of employees working in 
firms, one of its most important features is the inclusion of matched employer-employee 
microdata. Moreover, it provides information about each of the 17 Spanish regions in which 
surveyed establishments are located, allowing for regional analysis which is a central part of this 
research. 
The survey provides detailed information on wages and characteristics of workers, jobs 
and firms. Workers are classified as part-time or full-time according to the information provided 
by the firm. The wage concept used in this research is the gross hourly wage and in its 
calculation any payment by companies that has been incorporated. The analysis is carried out 
separately for men and women. The explanatory variables considered include characteristics of 
individuals and attributes of their jobs and firms. The former are controls relating to: the 
nationality of the individual (i.e. differentiating between Spaniards vs. non-Spaniards); the level 
of general education (primary, secondary, or tertiary education); and age. The characteristics of 
the job are: years of seniority in the current job (including its quadratic form); type of contract 
(indefinite or fixed-term); and occupation (unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled occupations), while 
attributes of the firms are: industries of activity (12 categories); size (four categories); type of 
collective agreement (firm, national sector, or sub-national sector agreements); and region of 
location of the firm. 
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The SES has some advantages over other surveys also used in the analysis of wage 
differentials between part- and full-time workers for the Spanish case, such as the MCVL. 
Although the MCVL presents a larger size and contains highly reliable administrative registers 
and longitudinal information, the SES contains matched employer-employee data that provide 
rich information on different variables that are crucial in explaining wage differentials and do 
not suffer from severe measurement error in the MCVL (namely educational level and 
occupation). Moreover, unlike the MCVL, the SES contains uncensored wages without 
maximum and minimum limits, and includes information regarding the number of hours worked, 
permitting the use of hourly wages as dependent variable. 
Regarding potential limitations of the dataset, note that with the SES it is not possible to 
take into account in the empirical analysis the potential selection bias associated with the 
selection of working part- or full-time by individuals. The usual form to correct this problem, 
apart from being controversial, requires the use of valid exclusion restrictions that are not 
available in the SES. However, the fact that most part-time employment in Spain is involuntary 
reduces the scope of this limitation in the Spanish context. In any case, the potential impact in 
our results of not being able to control for selection bias cannot be easily assessed. In the light of 
the results obtained in the available studies, it is extremely difficult to assess the effect of not 
controlling for self-selection. No clear pattern emerged from the literature review: in some 
papers, after controlling for self-selection, the wage penalty is reduced; in others, there is no 
effect or the penalty even increases. 
Observations with missing values on key variables and those for individuals aged less 
than 16 years or over 65 years have been filtered. As most previous studies on the relative wage 
treatment of part-time workers limit the analysis to private sector employees, observations 
corresponding to the public sector have been removed. The final sample is formed by 152,099 
observations, 89,344 men and 62,755 women, and the regional samples range between 2,152 and 
28,382 employees. The descriptive statistics of the samples can be consulted in Table A.2. 
3.2. Methodology 
In the empirical analysis, we use an extension of the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition, 
specifically adapted for use with matched employer-employee data. This technique departs from 
the estimation of the following semi-logarithmic wage equation: 
jijiij aεβXw ++=  (1) 
wherein: wij is the natural log of hourly wage of individual i in workplace j; Xi is a vector of 
controls including individuals’ characteristics and those of their jobs and the firms employing 
them; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated (including an intercept); εij is a stochastic error 
term; and aj is an error component corresponding to workplace j and invariant for all individuals 
working in the same workplace. 
Following the recommendation of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1998), as a 
first step of our decomposition analysis, equation (1) is estimated for the pool of workers (i.e., 
full- and part-time workers). Identification of workplace effects is guaranteed, given that there is 
more than one observation per workplace in the dataset. Since the result of Hausman’s contrast 
indicates that workplace-specific effects are correlated to the rest of the explanatory variables in 
equation (1), the model is estimated by fixed effects (which is equivalent to estimating by 
ordinary least squares with a set of workplace dummies). Relying on the properties of the 
ordinary least squares estimator, after the estimation of equation (1) with the pooled data, the 
average wage of the subgroup of workers s (s=full- or part-time workers) can be expressed as:  
ssss Xw ληθsβ ++= ˆ          where )1,0(~θ ,   )1,0(~λ  (2) 
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where: sw  stands for the mean natural log of the hourly wage of a given group s; sX  is a vector 
of the average of the set of explanatory variables for group s; βˆ  is the vector of coefficients 
estimated with equation (1) and the pooled data; σ is the estimated standard deviation of wage 
residuals of the pool of workers; sθ  is the average standardised residual of group s; η is the 
estimated standard deviation of workplace effects of the pool of full- and part-time workers; and 
sλ  is the average standardised workplace effect of group s. 
Using the pooled wage structure as the market price reference in the decomposition, the wage 
gap between part- and full-time workers can be written as follows:  
ηλsθβηλλsθθβ ∆+∆+∆=++= ˆ)()(ˆ)( XXXww fpfpfpfp ----  (3) 
Where: the subscript p is for part-time workers and f is for full-time workers; and a ∆ prefix 
denotes the average difference between both groups in the subsequent variable. 
In brief, equation (3) provides a decomposition of the part-time/full-time wage gap that 
quantifies the extent to which average wage differences between part-time and full-time workers 
are related to: (a) differences in observed characteristics )( fp XX - , valued at market prices ( βˆ ); 
(b) the influence of unobserved elements measured as the impact of differences between part- 
and full-time workers on the average standardised residual )( fp θθ -  multiplied by the money 
value per unit difference in the standardised residual ( σ ), which determines the specific wage 
penalty suffered by the disadvantaged group; and (c) the influence of workplace-related factors, 
namely the product of the difference in the average standardised workplace effect of part- and 
full-time workers )( fp λλ - , which measures the intensity of part-time workers’ segregation into 
low-wage workplaces, and the dispersion of wage differentials across workplaces (η), which 
determines the degree of the wage penalty for part-time workers resulting from this segregation. 
Note that the second term of the decomposition corresponds to an estimation of the average 
intra-firm wage differential in the Spanish economy between part- and full-time employees with 
the same observed characteristics and working in the same firm. 
4. Results 
Table 1 provides information on the wage differential between part- and full-time workers 
(measured as the logarithm of the wage per hour) and on the incidence of part-time work for 
Spain and the Spanish regions, distinguishing between male and female workers. A negative 
(positive) wage differential corresponds to a wage disadvantage (advantage) of part-time 
workers, whereas the incidence of part-time is measured on the total number of employees. This 
evidence shows that in Spain there is a significant negative average wage differential for part-
time workers, with a gap substantially lower in the case of men (-0.104 logarithmic points) than 
of women (-0.254 logarithmic points), and that the incidence of part-time employment is much 
higher in the case of women (27.7% of total employees) than of men (8.7%), as is usual in most 
advanced economies. 
Table A.2 contains the descriptive statistics for the samples used in the analysis.2 They 
reveal significant differences in observed characteristics of full- and part-time workers in Spain, 
which tend to be in general detrimental for part-time workers’ wages. So, without being 
exhaustive, the comparison between the characteristics of full- and part-time workers reveals 
that, for both genders, the latter have on average lower endowments of education (and of 
seniority in the firm just in the case of females); higher incidence of immigrants and temporary 
contracts; greater presence in occupations associated with lower levels of qualification and in 
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construction and, especially, services; and, finally, greater representation in smaller firms and 
firms covered by sectoral agreements (the latter being true only in the case of females). 
Conversely, part-time workers only exhibit better relative endowments of age, and just in the 
case of males. 
On the other hand, the magnitude of the average wage differential associated with part-
time work exhibits a significant regional heterogeneity, and regional differences in the incidence 
of part-time employment are also rather important (Table 1). Regarding the former, in the case of 
female workers the magnitude of the differential exceeds the national average in regions like 
Andalusia, Extremadura, or Madrid, whereas in others like Navarra or The Rioja the differential 
is notably lower (the maximum and minimum values of the wage differential are -0.315 log 
points for Extremadura and -0.071 for The Rioja, with a standard deviation of 0.071, and all the 
wage differentials estimated for Spanish regions are statistically significant at conventional 
levels). Regional differences are in general also important in the case of male workers (with an 
extreme value of the differential of -0.299 log points for Madrid and a standard deviation of 
0.100), although in this case wage differentials are not statistically significant for most regions. 
With regard to the incidence of part-time employment, as a matter of example among men the 
percentage of part-time workers in the Canary Islands (11.1%) doubles that of Asturias (5.5%), 
while among women, Navarra (31.4%) is ahead of Madrid (20.8%) by eleven percentage points. 
The results of applying the extension of the Juhn et al. (1993) methodology for the 
decomposition of the differentials in average wages between part-time and full-time workers in 
Spain are shown in Table 2, distinguishing between males (left panel) and females (right panel). 
In particular, the first row of the table shows the value of the raw differential in log hourly wages 
between the two groups of workers, while the rest of the rows show the value of the different 
terms of the decomposition (where a negative value indicates that the factor has a negative effect 
on the relative wages of part-time workers). For each case, we consider four specifications of the 
wage equation (1). The first specification (model 1) includes only explanatory variables related 
to the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals (i.e. nationality, education and age). 
The second specification (model 2) includes the same individual characteristics along with 
characteristics related to job and firm (seniority, type of contract, region, industry, size and type 
of collective agreement). The third specification (model 3) includes also categorical variables for 
occupation.3 The last specification (model 4) includes firm fixed effects instead of observed firm 
characteristics and thus allows controlling for the effect on wages of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. The results of models 1 to 3 are equivalent to those that would be obtained from a 
standard decomposition in two components (characteristics and returns) à la Oaxaca-Blinder, 
whereas results from model 4 also include the third component of the right side of the equation 
(3). 
The results of model 1 reveal that when only individual characteristics are considered, 
the lower wage levels of part-time workers cannot be explained by their relative endowments of 
characteristics, but essentially by a different wage treatment. In the case of male workers, the 
component associated with characteristics takes a negligible value of 0.002 log points — not 
significantly different from zero — while most of the origin of the wage differential (-0.104) 
corresponds to the unexplained part (-0.106). In the case of female workers, observed individual 
characteristics explain a relevant part of the differential (-0.104 log points or around 41% of the 
raw gap), but again most of the differential (-0.254) is related to the unexplained part (-0.150). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that when considering just individuals with the same socio-
demographic observed characteristics, the average part-time wage-penalty in the Spanish labour 
market is of -10.6 logarithmic points for males and of -15.0 points for female workers. 
The inclusion of additional explanatory variables related to the characteristics of jobs and firms 
(model 2) substantially increases the contribution of the explained component for both genders. 
In the case of male workers, lower educational levels and seniority, a higher incidence of fixed-
term contracts and a higher presence in low-wage industries arise as relevant explanatory factors 
 9  
of the wage disadvantage of part-time male workers, whereas the factor with a more significant 
positive effect for this group is their higher relative age.4 For female workers, the factors 
explaining lower wages of part-time employees are also related to lower endowments of 
education and seniority and higher presence in low-wage industries. Nevertheless, the most 
remarkable result of the evidence obtained from model 2 is that, in contrast with results with 
model 1, a very important part of the wage gap between part-time and full-time workers is now 
explained: the contribution of the explained part of the differential increases to 66% of the raw 
gap for men and to 82% for women. The unexplained part (or wage penalty) is of only -0.036 
log points for men and -0.046 log points for women, representing 35% and 18% of the total gap, 
respectively. When including also occupation as an explanatory variable (model 3), occupational 
segregation arises as a very relevant explanatory factor of the wage gaps between full- and part-
time workers, very especially for females5 (this factor alone explains 0.053 log points or 51% of 
the gap for males and 0.116 log points or 46% for females); although the rest of the results are 
overall rather similar, the unexplained components of the decomposition almost halves for both 
males (-0.016) and females (-0.024). These latter values are very different from the wage 
premium for part-time workers previously found for Spain by Cebrián et al. (2000), Pissarides et 
al. (2005), and Pagán (2007) using the ECHP, but are close to the results obtained by O'Dorchai 
et al. (2007) with the 1995 SES for men (-0.06 log points), and lower than those obtained by 
Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) and Fernández-Kranz et al. (2014) using the 
MCVL (between -0.06 and -0.13 log points) and a similar set of explanatory factors. It is worth 
mentioning that the estimated penalty according to model 3 (with similar controls to those 
included in the models summarised in figure 1) is very close to the one expected when 
regressing the wage penalty on the coverage of collective bargaining: around 4 percentage 
points. This result is another sign of the importance of this variable to explain cross-country 
differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers. 
The relevance of differences in characteristics as the main explanatory factor of the wage 
differential between part- and full-time workers is reinforced when observed firm level variables 
are replaced by firm fixed effects (model 4). According to this additional evidence, for both 
genders the wage disadvantage of part-time workers is almost fully explained now by their 
relative endowments of individual and job characteristics (the first term of the decomposition 
explains 31% of the raw gap for men and 57% for women) and, especially, by their relative 
segregation in low-wage firms (according to the second term the unequal distribution by firms of 
part- and full-time workers explains 69% of the gap for men and 42.5% for women). As a 
consequence, the third component associated with the wage residuals has a minimum influence 
to explain the gap: actually, it is not statistically different from zero both for male and female 
workers. Given that this term is an estimation of the average intra-firm wage differential 
between part- and full-time employees with the same characteristics, this last result shows that 
part- and full-time workers who possess the same observed characteristics and who work in the 
same type of job (including occupation) and in the same firm overall tend to receive a similar 
wage treatment in the Spanish labour market (i.e., there is no evidence of direct wage 
discrimination). This result is consistent with the high coverage of collective bargaining in 
Spain. 
On the other hand, Table 3 shows the results of the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition of 
average wages between part-time and full-time workers for each of the 17 Spanish regions (the 
upper panel refers to males and the lower panel to females) corresponding to model 4 (i.e. 
including firm fixed-effects). The obtained results show marked differences among regions, 
particularly for female workers. As regards component (1) of the decomposition, differences in 
endowments of observed characteristics are in the case of females systematically unfavourable 
for part-time workers in all considered regions and they are a relevant explanatory factor for the 
negative wage gap for part-time female workers in almost every region, whereas for males the 
first component of the decomposition has positive or negative values depending on the region. 
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As regards the effect of the second component, it is observed that both for males and females the 
different relative distribution of full- and part-time workers among firms tends to be a relevant 
explanatory factor of wage differentials in every region (this component is statistically 
significant for most regions, both for males and females). Finally, with a few exceptions, the 
values of the third component are for most Spanish regions not statistically different from zero 
for both males and females, so wage penalties against part-time workers are practically non-
existent at regional level. Overall, this evidence suggests that in most Spanish regions the bulk of 
the observed wage gap between full- and part-time workers is mainly explained by their 
different endowments of individual, job and firm characteristics and, therefore, that the 
significant regional heterogeneity observed for the Spanish regions in the magnitude of the wage 
differential between full- and part-time employees is essentially not explained by regional 
specific factors. So, the absence of wage penalties to part-time workers, even in the presence of 
such big differences, can probably be explained by the wage determination process operating in 
Spain with a high level of coverage of collective agreements in all regions. 
5. Conclusions 
This article has examined wage differentials between part- and full-time workers in Spain 
distinguishing by gender. It has contributed to the related literature by introducing a fully novel 
regional perspective into the analysis and by using an econometric decomposition method that 
takes advantage of the use of a matched employer-employee dataset. This technique allows, inter 
alia, estimating intra-firm wage differentials for part- and full-time workers with similar 
observed characteristics as well as the impact in the part-time wage penalty of the segregation of 
part-time workers in low-wage firms. 
The obtained evidence has shown that part-time workers in Spain experience a 
significant average wage disadvantage, and that this disadvantage is significantly higher for 
female workers. The results of the econometric decompositions have also shown that the wage 
penalty associated with part-time workers, both males and females, is almost fully explained by 
their relative characteristics and, in particular, by the significant segregation of part-time 
workers in low-wage firms. In fact, intra-firm wage differences between full- and part-time 
workers with similar observable productive characteristics working in the same firm are 
negligible for both genders, which suggests a similar wage treatment by Spanish firms of full- 
and part-time workers; hence, the absence of direct wage discrimination against part-time 
workers — a result that is probably related to the high coverage of collective agreements in the 
Spanish labour market. 
From a regional perspective, in the case of Spain it has been observed that regional 
differences in the incidence of part-time employment are rather significant and that observed 
wage differences between part-time and full-time workers also exhibit a very significant regional 
heterogeneity. The empirical evidence regarding the origin of the wage differential suggests, 
nevertheless, that in the majority of the Spanish region, most of the observed average wage 
differential between part- and full-time workers tends to be explained by worker endowment 
factors so that wage penalties do not usually exist at a regional level. This absence of wage 
penalties for part-time workers supports the hypothesis that a high coverage of wage bargaining 
prevents discriminatory practices against part-time workers, and reinforces the idea that one of 
the major sources of cross-country differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers is 
differences in labour market institutions such as collective bargaining. 
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7. Figures and tables  
 
Figure 1. 
Average unexplained component of wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers and 
coverage of collective bargaining.  
 
 
Country averages of wage penalties found in the literature for male part-time workers with similar 
specifications. Collective bargaining data refers to 2010 and have been obtained from ILOStat. 
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Table 1. 
Incidence of part-time work and wage differences between part-time and full-time workers in Spanish regions. 
 
Incidence of  
part-time work 
Wage differential 
part-time/full-time 
 Males Females Males Females 
Spain 0.087 0.277 -0.104*** -0.254*** 
Andalusia 0.089 0.296 -0.164*** -0.305*** 
Aragon 0.063 0.261  0.028 -0.146*** 
Asturias 0.054 0.213  0.028 -0.165*** 
Balearic Islands 0.071 0.220 -0.010 -0.192*** 
Canary Islands 0.111 0.231 -0.139*** -0.268*** 
Cantabria 0.058 0.233  0.050 -0.230*** 
Castilla-Leon 0.061 0.252 -0.016 -0.246*** 
Castilla La Mancha 0.064 0.279 -0.032 -0.269*** 
Catalonia 0.079 0.235 -0.151*** -0.247*** 
Valencia 0.099 0.306 -0.138*** -0.209*** 
Extremadura 0.069 0.273 -0.098** -0.315*** 
Galicia 0.067 0.226  0.045 -0.192*** 
Madrid 0.073 0.208 -0.299*** -0.314*** 
Murcia 0.090 0.286 -0.125*** -0.271*** 
Navarre 0.063 0.314  0.049 -0.071*** 
Basque Country 0.058 0.306  0.037 -0.227*** 
The Rioja 0.068 0.290 -0.083* -0.100*** 
Unweighted average 0.073 0.261 -0.060     -0.222 
Regional standard deviation 0.016 0.036   0.100 0.071 
Maximum 0.111 0.314   0.050     -0.071 
Minimum 0.054 0.208 -0.299     -0.315 
Notes: The incidence of part-time work is measured over total employees whereas the wage gap corresponds to the differential of 
the logarithm of the hourly wage between part- and full-time workers. Average unemployment rates for 2010 have been obtained 
from the Labour Force Survey. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 2.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. 
 Males    Females    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Wage differential  -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104***  -0.104*** -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.254*** 
Characteristics (1) 0.002(-2.0) -0.069(66.3)*** -0.088***(84.6) -0.032***(30.8) -0.104***(40.9) -0.208(81.9***) -0.229***(90.2) -0.144(56.7) 
Nationality -0.003***  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.000 -0.002***  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Educational attainment -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.030*** -0.052*** 
Age  0.031***  0.014***  0.011***  0.010***  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Tenure - -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014*** - -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.031*** 
Type of contract - -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Occupation - - -0.053*** -0.012*** - - -0.116*** -0.062*** 
Region -  0.007***  0.006*** - - -0.005*** -0.002*** - 
Industry of activity - -0.040*** -0.029*** - - -0.052*** -0.029*** - 
Firm size -  0.003***  0.003*** - - -0.006*** -0.006*** - 
Collective agreement -  0.003***  0.002*** - - -0.010*** -0.006*** - 
Firm fixed effects (2) - - - -0.072***(69.2) - - - -0.108***(42.5) 
Wage residuals (3) -0.106***(102.0) -0.036(34.6)*** -0.016***(15.4) 0.000(0.0) -0.150(59.1***) -0.046(18.1)*** -0.024***(9.8) -0.002(0.8) 
Number of observations 89,334 89,334 89,334 89,334 62,755 62,755 62,755 62,755 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial. Model 1 corresponds to a specification of the wage equation that includes individual characteristics (nationality, 
age and education); models 2 and 3 incorporate to the specification attributes of jobs and firms (tenure, type of contract, occupation, region, sector, size and type of collective agreement), whereas model 4 includes individual and job 
attributes and firm fixed effects instead of firm attributes. The percentage of the wage differential explained by each term appears in brackets. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 3.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. Regional disaggregated analysis.  
  Wage 
differential Characteristics (1) 
Firm fixed 
effects (2) 
Wage 
residuals (3) 
Number 
of observ. 
Males       
Andalusia  -0.164*** -0.041** -0.123*** -0.002 8,973 
Aragon  0.028 0.075*** -0.062*** 0.015 3,747 
Asturias  0.028 0.030 -0.019*** 0.017 2,971 
Balearic Islands  -0.010 -0.011 -0.005 0.006 2,316 
Canary Islands  -0.139*** -0.035** -0.109*** 0.005 3,69 
Cantabria  0.050 0.056*** -0.033*** 0.026 2,385 
Castilla-Leon  -0.016 0.020 -0.054*** 0.017 4,781 
Castilla La Mancha  -0.032 0.021 -0.029*** -0.024 3,68 
Catalonia  -0.151*** -0.074*** -0.084*** 0.006 14,763 
Valencia  -0.138*** -0.014 -0.114*** -0.009 7,389 
Extremadura  -0.098** -0.019 -0.075*** -0.004 2,042 
Galicia  0.045 0.000 0.005 0.039*** 4,803 
Madrid  -0.299*** -0.141*** -0.125*** -0.034** 15,32 
Murcia  -0.125*** -0.041* -0.091*** 0.007 2,764 
Navarre  0.049 0.002 -0.017 0.064*** 2,635 
Basque Country  0.037 0.007 -0.007 0.036** 5,69 
The Rioja  -0.083 -0.008 -0.050*** -0.026 1,395 
Females       
Andalusia  -0.305*** -0.149*** -0.156*** -0.002 5,975 
Aragon  -0.146*** -0.119*** -0.059*** 0.032** 2,345 
Asturias  -0.165*** -0.151*** -0.021 0.007 1,561 
Balearic Islands  -0.192*** -0.121*** -0.064*** -0.007 1,807 
Canary Islands  -0.268*** -0.142*** -0.151*** 0.025 2,685 
Cantabria  -0.230*** -0.119*** -0.104*** -0.008 1,229 
Castilla-Leon  -0.246*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.001 3,117 
Castilla La Mancha  -0.269*** -0.133*** -0.137*** 0.002 2,166 
Catalonia  -0.247*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.012 12,362 
Valencia  -0.209*** -0.125*** -0.086*** 0.002 4,83 
Extremadura  -0.315*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.005 1,063 
Galicia  -0.192*** -0.123*** -0.087*** 0.018 3,505 
Madrid  -0.314*** -0.179*** -0.121*** -0.014 13,062 
Murcia  -0.271*** -0.139*** -0.130*** -0.002 1,634 
Navarre  -0.071*** -0.097*** -0.007 0.033** 1,265 
Basque Country  -0.227*** -0.147*** -0.079*** -0.001 3,392 
The Rioja  -0.100*** -0.112*** 0.005 0.008 757 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 
with a specification of the wage equation that includes individual and job characteristics and firm fixed effects (model 4).* 
p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
 
                                                 
 
 
1 However, in countries like Australia and South Africa, a positive wage bonus for part-time workers is observed (Posel 
and Muller, 2007 and Booth and Wood, 2008).  
2 To conserve space, they correspond to the whole samples for the overall Spanish economy. Descriptive statistics of 
the samples for every Spanish region are available from the authors on request. 
3 The reason for separating out this variable in the analysis is that it potentially suffers from endogeneity in relation to 
the distribution of individuals between full- and part-time jobs, to the extent that part-time employment is often limited 
to low-wage occupations (see, eg Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). 
4 This finding is consistent with the fact in Spain a significant part of job contracts among part-time male workers is 
related to partial retirement (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2008). 
5 Obtained evidence suggests that the specific contribution to the full-time/part-time wage gap of certain variables such 
as industry and, especially, occupation is much higher in the case of females than in the case of male workers. The main 
reason is that part-time females are significantly segregated into low-wage occupations and industries (Table A.2), a 
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finding that is consistent with the fact that occupation and industry segregation are very relevant determinants of female 
relative wages everywhere (see, e.g., Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015). 
